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The countdown to Brexit has started. Given the short timeframe to Brexit and the large trading volumes, the authors
investigate which certainties and uncertainties exist regarding the future trade relationship between the European Union (EU)
and the United Kingdom (UK). Certain is that the UK is leaving the EU on 29 March 2019. On the basis of the recently
presented draft withdrawal agreement, however, the chances are apparent that the UK will not leave the EU Customs Union
and the internal market during a transition period ending in December 2020. Taking into account a possible transition
period, the authors discuss the most likely scenarios and their impact on trade between the EU and the UK, in particular
from a customs perspective.
1 INTRODUCTION
The clock is ticking. In March 2019, the United
Kingdom (UK) will formally leave the European Union
(EU) due to ‘Brexit’. The impact of Brexit on trade
between the EU and the UK1 appears to be particularly
high, given the trade volumes between the two parties.
Fifty-one per cent of total ‘imports’ in the UK comes
from the rest of the EU (Germany 14%, the
Netherlands 7% and France 5%).2 Forty-seven per cent
of the total ‘exports’ of the UK are to (other) EU coun-
tries (Germany 11% and France, the Netherlands and
Ireland each 6%).3
Given the short timeframe to Brexit and the large
trading volumes, we are examining in this article which
certainties and uncertainties exist at the present moment
regarding the future trade relationship between the EU
and the UK, predominantly from a customs perspective.
In paragraph 2, we will firstly discuss how the EU-UK
trade currently operates. Subsequently, in section 3 we
will analyse the possible post-Brexit situation(s) as of
March 2019. We then describe the ‘certainties’ in the
future EU-UK trade relationship in section 4. We pro-
vide a conclusion in section 5.
2 CURRENT EU-UK TRADE
The EU is a Customs Union. The Customs Union was
established in 1968 between the six original Member
States of the European Economic Community (EEC),
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and West Germany.4 The UK became a member of this
Customs Union on 1 January 1973. The establishment of
the customs union led to the introduction of a common
external tariff (regardless of the Member State in which
goods are imported the same import tariffs applied) and,
furthermore, goods brought into free circulation of the
customs union could be freely traded (without (again)
customs duties being levied).
With the Treaty of Maastricht, the ‘internal market’
was established in 1993.5 The internal market is char-
acterized by the abolition between Member States of
obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, ser-
vices and capital.6 However, on the basis of the already
existing Customs Union, the introduction of the internal
market did not bring much changes in the area of cus-
toms legislation and import duties. Trade changes
merely related to areas such as sales tax and excise
duties.7
* The authors are working at the Indirect Tax – Global Trade
department at EY Belastingadviseurs LLP in Amsterdam. Walter
de Wit is a Professor International and European Customs Law
at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Email: martijn.vroom@nl.
ey.com; walter.de.wit@nl.ey.com.
1 Where we discuss EU-UK trade, we refer to both the flow of goods
from the EU to the UK and the reverse situation (UK towards the
EU).
2 We refer to the European Union website on the UK [online via
europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/
unitedkingdom_nl (accessed 26 Mar. 2018)].
3 Ibid.
4 Council Decision 66/532/EEC of 26 July 1966 on the abolition of
customs duties and on the prohibition of quantitative restrictions
between Member States and on the application of the Common
Customs Tariff duties for products not listed in Annex II to the
Treaty, 1966, 2971.
5 Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC). 29 July
1992, No C 191. [s. l.]. ISSN 0378-6986. ‘Treaty on European
Union’, at 1.
6 Art. 26 para. 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU defines
the internal market as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is
ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties’.
7 We will not further elaborate on these fields in this article.
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As of 1 May 2016, new customs legislation entered
into force within the EU: the Union Customs Code
(UCC).8 The UCC created new EU customs legislation,
including simplified customs procedures, improved
cooperation between customs authorities and the roll-
out of new IT systems. With its direct applicability in the
EU, the UCC ensures unambiguous interpretation of
customs legislation and the unification of customs pro-
cedures and formalities. The UCC must be fully imple-
mented by the end of 2020, meaning that the Brexit
period coincides with the implementation of the UCC
in the EU.
As the UK is currently part of the EU (Customs
Union/internal market), EU-UK trade is characterized
by the following elements:
– No customs duties;
– No customs formalities;
– No physical checks;
– No trade restrictions;
– UCC legislation applicable.
With regard to goods coming from outside the EU before
being imported into the EU or UK (and possibly being
traded) or being properly exported, in addition to the
above, the following characteristics apply:
– Common external customs tariffs;
– Large number of free trade agreements applicable;9
– No freedom for individual Member States to con-
clude their own free trade agreements;
– No freedom for individual Member States to intro-
duce trade barriers themselves.
3 EU-UK TRADE RELATIONSHIP AFTER BREXIT
3.1 ‘Nothing Is Agreed Until Everything
Is Agreed’
On 29 March 2017, the UK notified the EU of its
decision to withdraw from the EU within the mean-
ing of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU). Article 50 TEU stipulates that on 29 March
2019 (two years after notification from the UK), the
EU Treaties will no longer apply to the UK. This is
called ‘Brexit’.
Article 50 TEU also stipulates that the European
Council, after negotiations with the UK, will agree on
the conditions for the withdrawal, taking into
account ‘the framework of the future relations of the
UK with the EU’. These negotiations started on 19
June 2017.10 Prior to the start of the negotiations,
both the EU and the UK made their views known and
published guidelines for the negotiations.11 In Table
1, we have listed some of the most important (initial)
principles of both the EU and the UK (often opposed
to each other):
Table 1 Principles of the EU and the UK
EU UK
Four EU freedoms (people,
goods, services, capital) are
indivisible: all or nothing
Free movement of goods, but no
free movement of persons
Negotiations on future (trade)
relationship can only start
after ‘sufficient progress’ on
withdrawal from the EU
Negotiations on future (trade)
relationship and withdrawal
from the EU can take place
simultaneously
A non-EU member cannot have
the same rights and benefits
as an EU member
Getting control over own laws
and – at the same time – access
to European markets
Currently, the Brexit negotiations are on the way for
around ten months. Looking at the way the negotiations
have been conducted so far, it is apparent that the EU’s
principle on the negotiation process is followed so far:
negotiations on future (trade) relationship would only
start after ‘sufficient progress’ on UK’s withdrawal from
the EU. Only when the EU announced on 8 December
2017 that ‘sufficient progress’ had been made on the
withdrawal it was concluded that negotiations could
commence on the future relationship.12
The documents published by the EU show that on 6
February 2018 a transition period was officially men-
tioned for the first time during the negotiations.13 At a
press conference on 19 March 2018, David Davis (UK)
and Michel Barnier (EU27) subsequently presented a
joint text of the ‘withdrawal agreement’ and mentioned
this agreement as a ‘decisive’ step in the negotiations.14
8 Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 9 Oct. 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code.
9 We refer to the website of the European Commission regarding the
current status of trade agreements and negotiations [online via ec.
europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-
agreements (accessed 19 Apr. 2018)].
10 We refer to the agenda of the Brexit negotiations of 19 June 2017 as
published on the website of the European Commission [online via
ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/art50-agenda-
20170619_en.pdf (accessed 19 Apr. 2018)].
11 With regard to the EU we refer to: General Secretariat of the
Council (2017), Special meeting of the European Council (Art.
50) (29 Apr. 2017) – Guidelines, EUCO XT 20004/17. With regard
to the UK we refer to: UK Department for Exiting the European
Union (2017), Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal
from the European Union, Cm 9446 and the online published
position papers [online via gov.uk/government/news/position-
papers-published-ahead-of-round-three-negotiations (accessed 19
Apr. 2018)].
12 European Commission (2017), Communication from the
Commission to the European Council (Art. 50) on the state of
progress of the negotiations with the United Kingdom under Art.
50 of the Treaty on European Union, COM(2017) 784 final.
13 We refer to the agenda of the Brexit negotiations of 6–9 Feb. 2018
as published on the website of the European Commission [online
via ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/agenda_6-9_
february_2018.pdf (accessed on 19 Apr. 2018)].
14 European Commission (2017), Press statement by Michel Barnier
following the latest round of Art. 50 negotiations [online via
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-18-2161_en.htm
(accessed 19 Apr. 2018)].
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The withdrawal agreement (in draft form) contains the
proposals for a transition period that ends on 31
December 2020. After 31 December 2020, withdrawal
from the customs union and internal market will there-
fore take place anyway (but possibly earlier on 29 March
2019). However, from 29 March 2019 the UK is no
longer part of the EU.
During the possible transition period, the UK remains
subject to EU law and part of both the internal market
and the customs union. The UK will be able to negotiate,
sign and ratify trade agreements during the transition
period, which can enter into force at the end of the
transitional period, unless an earlier date has been agreed
with the EU.
A lot of work remains to be done to complete the
entire withdrawal agreement (in time) and some impor-
tant problems still have to be resolved. These problems
include, for example, the question of the border between
Northern Ireland and Ireland, where the aim will be to
avoid a hard Irish border despite the eventual departure
from the Customs Union. The issue of managing the
withdrawal agreement and the role of the Court of
Justice of the EU (CJEU) must also be agreed (with the
exception of its role in reviewing the rights of the citi-
zens). We note, as emphasized in the press conference,
that legal certainty about the withdrawal agreement will
only come with legal ratification, probably by the end of
2018. We point out in this context that ‘nothing has
been agreed until everything has been agreed’.
For the time being, the following two possible scenar-
ios can therefore be assumed:
(1) A transition period (in accordance with the draft
agreement) that lasts until 31 December 2020,
followed by Brexit as of 1 January 2021; or
(2) Brexit per 29 March 2019, as the negotiation or
ratification process cannot be completed in time
(before 29 March 2019) and therefore there will
be no transition period.
Below we first describe the customs consequences of
Brexit in the event that there is no transition period
(the so-called hard Brexit). Secondly, we discuss the
customs consequences during a possible transition per-
iod. Thirdly, we describe the possible scenarios for the
situation after a possible transition period (which could
also apply sometime after the end of a Hard Brexit).
3.2 Trade in Case of ‘Hard Brexit’
Should the EU and the UK not come to an agreement
during the negotiations (or if a Member State refuses to
ratify the outcome of the negotiations), the situation
arises that none of the EU Treaties will be applicable to
the UK as of 29 March 2019.15 This is also called ‘Hard
Brexit’.
This situation would mean an immediate departure
from the UK from the EU. It would also have the far-
reaching effect that the UK no longer belongs to the EU
internal market and Customs Union. Any movement of
goods between the EU and the UK (and vice versa)
would become subject to customs formalities and import
duties. Since no bilateral treaty would be applicable
between the EU and the UK, there would be a fall back
to the basic rules as formulated by the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
The EU acts as a whole within the WTO, the Member
States are not separate members. The UK can probably
remain a member of the WTO after the Brexit, but it is
not yet certain under which conditions this could be
done and which trade agreements would apply.16 In
principle, the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ (MFN) clauses
will be used. This means that no reduced customs tariffs
will be applied in the mutual traffic between the UK and
the EU. In this scenario, there is no free trade agreement
between the UK and the EU to fall back on.
We also note that about half of UK trade is already
covered by the WTO rules (as is the case with all WTO
countries with which the EU has not concluded a trade
agreement, such as the US and China). Trade under
WTO rules is therefore not a problem in itself, but the
sudden change from the EU Customs Union to WTO
rules is.
In the case of ‘hard Brexit’, EU-UK trade would be
characterized by the following elements:
– Customs duties;
– Customs formalities;
– Physical checks;
– (possible) trade restrictions;
– UCC legislation not applicable to the UK;
– Common external customs tariff not applicable to
UK (UK has the freedom to set its own rates subject
to WTO rules);
– EU free trade agreements no longer applicable to the
UK;
– UK may conclude its own trade agreements.
3.3 Trade During (Possible) Transition Period
According to the draft withdrawal agreement, the UK
will continue to participate in the EU Customs Union
and the Internal Market (with all four freedoms) during
the proposed transition period.17 In principle, there
would be little or no change in trade between the EU
and the UK during this period (31 March 2019–31
15 As stated in Art. 50 TEU. We note that the UK will not only have to
negotiate with the EU on new trading conditions, but also with all
other 162 members of the WTO.
16 E.g. according to the words of the Director-General of the WTO,
Roberto Azevedo [online via bbc.com/news/business-36470809
(accessed 19 Apr. 2018)].
17 European Council (2018), Council Decision supplementing the
Council Decision of 22 May 2017 authorizing the opening of
negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland for an agreement setting out the arrangements
for its withdrawal from the European Union, XT 21004/18 COR 2.
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December 2020). No customs formalities and controls
would therefore apply in trade between the UK and the
EU during this period.
It is also apparent from the draft of the withdrawal
agreement (Articles 48 and 49) that also from a VAT and
excise duties perspective everything remains unchanged
during the transition period. If this were different, VAT
and excise duties would give rise to customs formalities
and controls (import and export declarations would have
to be made for VAT and excise duties purposes).
During the transition period, the UK will have to take
all necessary measures to preserve the integrity of the EU
internal market and of the Customs Union. The UK must
continue to comply with the EU trade policy. In parti-
cular, the UK will have to ensure that its customs autho-
rities continue to act in accordance with the mission of
the EU customs authorities, inter alia by collecting the
Common Customs Tariff duties and by carrying out all
border checks required under the UCC in relation to
other third countries.
As part of the EU Customs Union, it is in principle
not permitted to negotiate with third countries as an
individual Member State. However, on the basis of the
draft withdrawal agreement, the UK may sign and ratify,
during the transitional period, international agreements
made in its own capacity in the areas falling under the
exclusive competence of the EU, provided that these
agreements do not enter into force or apply during the
transition period, unless expressly permitted by the EU.
3.4 Trade After Transition Period
The way in which the EU and the UK will trade after a
possible transition period is for the time being still
uncertain. In recent months, however, the contours
have become much clearer. For example, the Brexit
negotiator on behalf of the EU, Michel Barnier, presented
the following slide to the EU leaders on 19 December
2017, from which it can be derived that he considers just
two realistic scenarios: a free trade agreement or ‘no deal’
(Figure 1).18
In this slide the thinking steps of the UK are repre-
sented by means of ‘red lines’ (as a sign why an option is
not possible). In view of UK’s Brexit principles (no
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice ECJ, no
financial contribution to the EU, autonomous trade pol-
icy, etc.), we understand these thinking steps as to why
certain scenarios are not deemed to be possible (such as
a Swiss, Norwegian or Turkish model). For that reason,
we distinguish, like Barnier, in principle the following
two realistic scenarios for the ultimate future trade rela-
tionship between the EU and the UK:
(1) A comprehensive free trade agreement, similar
(although more far-reaching) to the recent EU
free trade agreements with Canada and South
Korea;
No deal, as a result of which EU-UK trade would fall
back to WTO rules. In addition to these two we consider
two more (perhaps less realistic) scenarios:
(2) A Customs Union with the EU;
(3) Elimination of customs duties and compliance
obligations on import into the UK.
Figure 1
18 European Commission, Task Force for the Preparation and
Conduct of the Negotiations with the United Kingdom under Art.
50 TEU, TF50 (2017) 21 – Commission to EU 27.
BREXIT: THE ROAD AHEAD FOR EU-UK TRADE
EC TAX REVIEW 2018/4 199
We note that talks on the future trade relationship
between the EU and the UK have officially started on 18
April 2018.19 It is expected that the future trade negotia-
tions will take place every two weeks before the EU27
come together at the European Council in June 2018 for
a review of the progress on the Brexit negotiations. It is
reported by the Guardian that the EU is so far undecided
about how much detail should go into the text on the
future relationship before Brexit day in March 2019;
Germany is pushing for a detailed, legally precise text
to avoid surprises during the post-Brexit trade talks, but
Scandinavian and Benelux (i.e. Belgium, the Netherlands
and Luxemburg) countries prefer to keep the document
vague to give the UK maximum room to change its mind
(during the post-Brexit trade talks).20
3.4.1 Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
The most likely scenario at the moment – in our opi-
nion – is that during the current negotiations, which
must be concluded by the end of 2018, agreement will
be reached on a transition period and also on the ‘con-
tours’ of a free trade agreement. The exact content of
these contours will then be further negotiated during the
transition period with the aim of reaching agreement and
having an agreement in place on 31 December 2020
(when the transition period comes to an end).
It is generally expected that a comprehensive free
trade agreement will have to be concluded between the
EU and the UK, as a regular free trade agreement only
concerns the trade of goods. The British economy, how-
ever, consists for 80% of services, which means that the
conclusion of a regular free trade agreement would not
be sufficient. In the British/EU corridors, therefore, a
‘CETA plus plus’21 is already being discussed, referring
to a more far-reaching version of the recently concluded
free trade agreement between the EU and Canada. We
note in this respect that the negotiations on CETA have
lasted for at least eight years,22 which is not an unusual
timeline for negotiations on a trade agreement. It there-
fore seems very ambitious for the EU and the UK to
reach a comprehensive agreement as early as 31
December 2020. On the other hand, the UK will remain
one of EU’s major trading partners (and vice versa) after
Brexit, due to which the urgency to conclude a free trade
agreement within a short timeframe is very apparent for
all parties.
Under CETA, 98% of import duties between the EU
and Canada have been eliminated. However, non-tariff
trade barriers and traditional rules of origin would apply
to EU-UK trade under an agreement such as CETA. In
order to make use of CETA (and therefore possibly also
of the future comprehensive EU-UK free trade agree-
ment), rules of origin must therefore be complied with.
Only when the goods comply with these rules of origin
can the benefits of the free trade agreement be enjoyed.
If we look at the origin rules as they apply under
CETA, goods will only comply with the origin rules if
they are:
– ‘Wholly obtained’ (like plants grown and harvested
there, animals born and raised there, raw materials,
etc.) in the EU or the UK;
– Produced in the EU or the UK with exclusively
originating materials; or
– Produced in the EU or UK of certain non-originating
materials that have undergone ‘sufficient processing’
in the EU or the UK.
The above means that goods traded between the EU or
the UK do not automatically qualify for the EU-UK free
trade agreement to be concluded (and thus do not auto-
matically benefit from reduced (up to 0%) import
duties). The EU-UK free trade agreement would only
apply if the (preferential) rules of origin are complied
with. For example, a good that is produced in the USA
and shipped to the UK for further distribution in the EU
will in principle have no EU or UK origin (but US
origin). This means that import duties will have to be
paid on import into the UK (in the absence of a free
trade agreement). Upon import subsequently in the EU,
the good will again be subject to import duties (now that
the rules of origin are not complied with, the EU-UK free
trade agreement will not apply). Apart from this exam-
ple, many more scenarios exist in which the EU-UK free
trade agreement would not be applicable as a result of
not meeting the rules of origin.
CETA does however contain provisions that open up
the possibility of cumulation of origin. This would mean
that products originating from a country with which
both the EU and the UK have a free trade agreement
(in the future, for example, with Mexico or Canada) can
be included in determining whether a product originates
under the EU-UK free trade agreement.
The above makes it clear that an EU-UK free trade
agreement would make a big difference to the current
EU customs union. Although in principle no import
duties apply in both cases, a free trade agreement
requires a far-reaching administration and control of
the origin of goods. Only when the origin can be
shown properly the benefits can be enjoyed under the
free trade agreement. If not, import duties will be due.
19 We refer to the agenda of the Brexit negotiations of 16–18 Apr.
2018 as published on the website of the European Commission
[online via ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/
agenda_16-18_april.pdf (accessed 19 Apr. 2018)].
20 We refer to the website of the Guardian [theguardian.com/politics/
2018/apr/18/brexit-first-talks-on-uks-future-relationship-with-eu-
begin (accessed 19 Apr. 2018)].
21 E.g. according to the words of the chief negotiator of the EU,
Michel Barnier [online via theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/23/
uk-likely-to-end-up-with-canadian-style-deal-warns-michel-barnier
(accessed 19 Apr. 2018)].
22 We refer to the press release from the European Commission
regarding the start of the CETA negotiations [online via trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/june/tradoc_143427.pdf (accessed 19
Apr. 2018)].
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In the case of a comprehensive free trade agreement,
EU-UK trade is further characterized by the following
elements:
– Reduced (up to 0%) customs duties, insofar as rules
of origin are met;
– Customs formalities;
– Physical checks;
– (possible) trade restrictions;
– UCC legislation not applicable to the UK;
– Common external customs tariff not applicable to
UK (UK has the freedom to set its own rates subject
to WTO rules);
– EU free trade agreements no longer applicable to the
UK;
– UK may conclude its own trade agreements.
3.4.2 No Deal: WTO Scenario
Less likely, but certainly not inconceivable, is the WTO
scenario (no future trade deal as of December 2020).
This is made clear, for example, by statements from
President of the European Council Donald Tusk: ‘So
much time has been spent on the simple part and now
we de facto have less than a year to negotiate a transi-
tional arrangement and the framework for our future
relationship’ and ‘we all know that separating is difficult,
but separating and building a new relationship is much
more difficult’.23,24 We refer to section 3.2 for the cir-
cumstances and consequences on EU-UK trade. We do
note, however, that it is very well conceivable in this
scenario that a free trade agreement will be concluded
between the EU and the UK after some period of time (as
described in section 3.4.1). We therefore see this sce-
nario primarily as a realistic ‘short-term’ option.
3.4.3 A Customs Union with the EU
A post-Brexit Customs Union would contradict one of
the UK’s main reasons for leaving the EU: applying an
autonomous trade policy. In a post-Brexit Customs
Union the UK would not be able to set its own external
customs tariffs and would in principle not have the
freedom to conclude its own free trade agreements (or
to introduce trade barriers).
To date, only Turkey and the microstates Andorra
and San Marino have a Customs Union with the EU in
place.25 If we focus on Turkey (as a large state), it is
noteworthy that this Customs Union is limited in scope,
as it covers all industrial goods but does not address
agriculture (except processed agricultural products), ser-
vices or public procurement.26,27 Moreover, Turkey has
no choice but to follow EU trade policy without being
involved in EU decision-making or negotiations with
third countries (i.e. it is compelled to negotiate its own
free trade agreements with these third countries).28
Another issue in the EU-Turkey Customs Union in our
opinion is that Turkey becomes a vulnerable market for
products coming from countries which sign free trade
agreements with the EU. This is due to the fact that the
countries with whom the EU concludes free trade agree-
ments, do not necessarily have an incentive to conclude
a free trade agreement with Turkey as well.29 These
countries can access the Turkish market by distributing
goods via the EU, without having to open their own
market for Turkey,30 due to which Turkish companies
could be at disadvantage compared to EU companies.
In our opinion, a post-Brexit Customs Union would
mean that the UK – from a trade or customs perspec-
tive – in practice would remain a ‘member’ of the EU
(Customs Union), but without having any say or power
in the decision-making. Hence, we consider this very soft
form of Brexit disadvantageous (particularly from a UK
point of view) compared to the current situation (as
outlined in section 2) and, even, compared to a scenario
such as the comprehensive free trade agreement (out-
lined in paragraph 3.4.1), as the UK would then at least
be able to apply an autonomous trade policy.31
The majority of the House of Lords of the British
parliament however, seems to be in favour of a post-
Brexit Customs Union with the EU.32 This position
23 We refer to the publication on the website of Bloomberg [online via
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-08/u-k-and-eu-strike-
brexit-deal-opening-path-to-trade-talks (accessed 19 Apr. 2018)].
24 We note that if there is a transition period, there will be more time
for negotiations on a future relationship (i.e. until 31 Dec. 2020).
25 We refer to the website of the European Commission regarding the
current Customs Unions [online via ec.europa.eu/taxation_cus
toms/business/calculation-customs-duties/rules-origin/customs-
unions_en (accessed 19 Apr. 2018)].
26 We refer to the website of the European Commission regarding
Turkey [online via http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/turkey/ (accessed 19 Apr. 2018)].
27 As mentioned in para. 3.4.1., the British economy consists for 80%
of services, which means that a Customs Union based on the
Turkish model would not be sufficient (as services are not covered
there).
28 Except in relation to those areas excluded from the Customs Union
(e.g. agricultural goods in the Turkish situation).
29 We note that these issues might have resulted in the EU’s proposal
to modernize the Customs Union with Turkey. We refer to
European Commission – press release, Commission proposes to
modernize the Customs Union with Turkey, Brussels, 21 Dec.
2016. We note that this proposal is currently being discussed in
the EU Council.
30 As outlined in para. 3.4.1., goods only qualify under a free trade
agreement if they fulfil the ‘rules of origin’. Goods manufactured or
processed in Turkey do in most cases not fulfil these EU (or EU’s
counterpart) rules of origin. One exception is the possibility for
diagonal cumulation under the Pan-Euro Med Convention, see
‘Commission notice concerning the application of the Regional
Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin
or the protocols on rules of origin providing for diagonal cumula-
tion between the Contracting Parties to this Convention’, OJ EU, 9
Mar. 2017, C73/6.
31 Even though we understand the advantages of avoiding a hard
border issue in Ireland and limiting the Brexit impact on customs
authorities compared to the scenario of a comprehensive free trade
agreement.
32 The House of Lords voted to amend the UK withdrawal bill. Under
this amendment the UK government is committed to ‘outlining the
BREXIT: THE ROAD AHEAD FOR EU-UK TRADE
EC TAX REVIEW 2018/4 201
completely contradicts the position of the UK govern-
ment, which is that the UK will leave the Customs
Union.33 We therefore expect interesting political devel-
opments in this respect in the UK the coming weeks or
months.
We refer to section 3.2 for the circumstances and
consequences on EU-UK trade in this scenario, whereby
we note that customs formalities and physical checks
would still be required (as is currently the case in the
EU-Turkey Customs Union).
3.4.4 Elimination of Customs Duties on Import into
the UK
In order to keep the UK market attractive for producing
and distributing goods after Brexit and prevent from the
(possible) negative impact of a no-deal scenario (we refer
to paragraph 3.2), the UK could consider to eliminate all
customs duties and reduce compliance obligations upon
the import of goods into the UK. The advantage of this
scenario would be that less focus has to be placed in the
UK on customs compliance. In this scenario, it would be
less important how a product should be classified for
customs purposes, what the origin of that product is and
whether or not the customs value is correct, putting less
pressure on customs authorities and businesses in the
UK (see also section 4.4. below). Another advantage will
be that imports of goods into the UK would be stimu-
lated due to the absence of tariffs and compliance obli-
gations. A disadvantage would be that certain
(particularly producing) sectors within the UK would
lose protection from duty rates on non-UK products.
Based on WTO law,34 the UK is not allowed to dis-
criminate between different WTO members (Article 1 of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT
1947)), except where it has a customs union/free trade
agreement in place or is giving preferences to developing
countries. Therefore, the UK would have to eliminate the
tariffs and obligations not just in relation to the EU, but
in relation to all WTO members unilaterally in this
scenario.
It is further important to mention in this respect that
the elimination of customs duties and the associated
reduction of compliance obligations only works one
way. It would be up to the UK’s counterpart (such as
the EU) to decide whether or not to levy customs duties
on exports from the UK. However, the WTO counterpart
of the UK is normally not able to choose. This is due to
the fact that without a free trade agreement in place, a
WTO member cannot simply eliminate tariffs on goods
originating from the UK, due to the non-discrimination
principle (as outlined above). It would then also have to
eliminate the tariffs on goods coming from all other
WTO member countries. UK exports could therefore
still be subject to customs duties and compliance obliga-
tions, where the UK imports are not.
We refer to section 3.2 for the circumstances and
consequences on EU-UK trade, whereby we note that
customs duties and compliance obligations mentioned
there will not be applicable with respect to the UK.
4 CERTAINTIES FOR THE FUTURE EU-UK TRADE
RELATIONSHIP
Regardless of the outcome of the negotiations (except for
the – currently – unlikely Customs Union scenario as
outlined in paragraph 3.4.3), certainties exist regarding
the future trade relationship between the EU and the UK.
Below we outline some of these.
4.1 Customs Formalities
In any scenario (even in a Customs Union similar to the
Turkish model (which is unlikely to come in place, we
refer to section 3.4 above)), all EU-UK movements of
goods will become subject to customs formalities, both
on the EU and the UK side. In the case of a transition
period, this effect would only be postponed until
December 2020 (no customs formalities yet during the
transition period). Pursuant to the UCC (Article 6 para-
graph 1, Article 6 paragraph 3 and Article 158 paragraph
2), an electronic customs declaration is required in the
EU (in other cases paper declarations are still permitted)
when the customs border (which will come into place as
a result of Brexit) is crossed.35 This customs declaration
must contain all the information required for the provi-
sions applicable to the customs procedure for which the
goods are declared (Article 162 of the UCC and Article
222 of the UCC). In addition, for the customs declara-
tion for free circulation, in principle a number of sup-
porting documents must be submitted in order to be
able to accept the declaration (Article 163 (1) of the
UCC). These supporting documents serve to substantiate
claims in the customs declaration, such as the origin, the
customs value, the type of goods, the weight, etc.
The above legal determination that a customs declara-
tion must be made, with the correct information and
evidence concerning (inter alia) the origin, customs
value and classification of the goods can have major
consequences for companies and authorities. Filing an
incorrect customs declaration is punishable (usually
steps’ it had taken to secure ‘an arrangement which enables the UK
to continue participating in a customs union with the European
Union’. We refer to The Guardian, Brexit Bill: May Under Pressure
After Two Big Defeats in Lords, Amendment calling for UK to con-
tinue in customs union with EU passed by majority of 123 (18 Apr.
2018).
33 We refer to the website of the Guardian [online via www.theguar
dian.com/politics/2018/apr/26/nicky-morgan-tories-will-not-be-for
given-if-brexit-hurts-economy (accessed 19 Apr. 2018)].
34 Whereby we assume that the UK will remain a member of the
WTO after the Brexit.
35 We assume that these requirements will also apply in the UK after
Brexit.
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under administrative law, but sometimes also under
criminal law). Companies will therefore be faced with a
higher administrative burden (to collect the above data)
and higher costs (apart from the higher administrative
burden, the submission of customs declarations will cost
money as it usually involves third parties (customs
agents) being hired). In addition, companies active in
the EU-UK trade may have to appoint customs educated
personnel (or have to educate existing staff) in order to
meet the obligations.
4.2 EU Trade Agreements
The EU currently has around forty (regional or bilateral)
free trade agreements in place.36,37 In total, these forty
agreements cover about sixty countries worldwide.38 The
UKwill cease to be a party to the current and future EU free
trade agreements as of 29 March 2019 as a result of Brexit.
We note in this regard that an agreement on a possi-
ble transition period in principle only has effect between
the EU and the UK. As far as the free trade agreements
concluded by the EU with third countries are concerned,
this transitional period does in principle not apply: these
free trade agreements are strictly speaking no longer
applicable to the UK from the moment the UK leaves
the EU. However, the UK will have to abide by all EU
international agreements, including free trade agree-
ments, on the basis of the draft withdrawal agreement.
At the same time, there is no guarantee that trading
partners from third countries will do the same. Our
expectation is that some (major) trading partners will
demand UK concessions if they want to retain the same
benefits they currently enjoy under EU trade agreements
during a transition period and beyond.
This can in particular lead to the situation in which
the export of goods from the UK to countries with which
the EU has trade agreements becomes more expensive
(as those could become subject to import duties in that
other country) compared to exports from the EU’s main-
land to these countries (as those would not become
subject to import duties). This situation could already
occur after 29 March 2019, depending on the goodwill
of UK’s trading partners.
4.3 Customs Authorizations and Binding
Information
The UCC facilitates various regulations that simplify the
application of customs legislation or offer (financial and/
or trade) benefits to companies (such as transit, storage
in customs warehouses, inward/outward processing). In
almost all cases, however, it is necessary for the applica-
tion of these regulations to make use of a customs license
(Article 211 of the UCC). Customs licenses can only be
granted to persons based in the EU (Article 211 para-
graph 3 under a UCC). This means that companies based
in the UK (without permanent establishment on the EU’s
mainland) from 29 March 2019 or 1 January 2021 (if the
withdrawal agreement with transition period is accepted
by both parties) can no longer use customs licenses in
the EU. All advantages of these permits will therefore be
denied to UK entities if they do not establish an EU-
based entity or otherwise take action (e.g. forms of
customs representation). For the opposite case, EU per-
sons without a permanent establishment in the UK, the
consequences will probably be the same.
In addition, ‘binding information’39 issued by the
British Customs Authority will no longer have effect on
the EU’s mainland (and vice versa).
4.4 Companies and Customs Authorities
Are not Ready (Yet)
Research initiated by the Dutch Ministry of Economic
Affairs shows that out of all companies that have shipped
goods between the Netherlands and the UK more than
35,000 companies are not yet known to Dutch customs.40
This most likely means that all these companies do not
have any customs function yet and have not yet been
involved in essential customs matters such as customs
valuation, tariff classification and origin of goods, which
are required for the submission of a correct customs
declaration. We therefore expect that these companies in
particular will be hit hard by Brexit (in all scenarios). They
will most definitively require a transition period in order
to prepare themselves. This research only relates to com-
panies shipping goods between the Netherlands and the
UK; the total number of companies shipping goods
between the EU and the UK without being known to
customs authorities is most likely much higher.
Brexit therefore requires more personnel with cus-
toms knowledge: not only on the side of businesses but
also on the part of customs authorities (both EU and
UK). Customs authorities face a significant increase in
the number of customs declarations and still need to be
able to effectively carry out their controls and checks.
However, the supply on the labour market with the
necessary customs knowledge and experience is cur-
rently inadequate.41 The immediate expansion of
36 In addition, the EU is negotiating trade agreements with several
countries (e.g. Brazil, India, USA). With Japan (a major trading
partner) it was able to conclude negotiations on a free trade agree-
ment in Dec. 2017.
37 We refer to the website of the European Commission regarding the
current status of trade agreements and negotiations [online via ec.
europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-
agreements (accessed 19 Apr. 2018)].
38 Ibid.
39 In the field of classification or origin of goods.
40 Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate and the Ministry
of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (by KPMG) (2018),
Impact van non-tarifaire handelsbelemmeringen als gevolg van
Brexit (Impact of non-tariff trade barriers due to Brexit),
Reference: A1700012187.D5.
41 Ibid.
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customs capacity at both the level of the authorities and
businesses can therefore be difficult and can only be
expected to be met with significant delay.42
Another complicating factor is the IT infrastructure,
both on the part of companies and those of the autho-
rities. Most striking in this context is the new customs IT
system that the British Customs Authority (HMRC)
introduces three months before the start of Brexit, in
January 2019. This system is called the Customs
Declaration Service (CDS). Due to Brexit an increase in
the number of UK customs declarations is expected from
55 million to 255 million per year.43 The big question is
whether CDS will be ready in time to handle such a large
number of declarations in such a short period of time
(especially in the case of a hard Brexit as of March 2019)
The timing of the introduction – so close to Brexit – also
seems unfortunate. In this respect too, a possible transi-
tion period until 1 January 2021 would be most
welcome.
4.5 Irish Customs Border
The border between Ireland and Northern Ireland is the
only land border separating the EU and the UK. There
are some 200 possible crossing points on this border
which stretches 500 kilometres.44 With the disappear-
ance of the EU Customs Union, this border will likely
change into a customs border (between the EU and the
UK). This Irish border seems to be a sensitive issue in the
negotiations at the moment. The European Parliament
calls it one of the most politically sensitive aspects of
Brexit.45
In the joint report of December 2017, both the
EU27 and the UK committed to avoid a ‘hard border’
(mainly referring to (physical) customs checks at the
border crossing) on the island of Ireland following
the withdrawal of the UK. However, given that the
Customs Union will most likely disappear with
respect to the UK (as explained above), it seems
unlikely that there will be no ‘hard border’ between
Ireland and the UK (otherwise the external borders of
the EU cannot be controlled along the 500 kilometres
of border).
The withdrawal agreement does provide for a solu-
tion in which Northern Ireland (excluding territorial
waters) would be considered to be inside the Customs
Union, even if the rest of the UK would be out.46 This
proposal is called the ‘Common regulatory area’ consti-
tuting an area comprising the EU and Northern Ireland
without internal borders in which the free movement of
goods is ensured.47 This would mean that there would
be no need for customs controls at the Irish border, but
there would be customs controls between Northern
Ireland and the rest of the UK. The withdrawal agree-
ment shows that agreement has not yet been reached on
this point,48 in contrast to many other points, and it is
uncertain (if not unlikely) whether agreement will be
reached in relation to this solution.
There are also other solutions available that could
mitigate the disadvantages of a ‘hard’ Irish border. The
European Commission published a study on 22
November 2017 that would prevent a hard border
between Ireland and Northern Ireland with regard to
customs controls and the movement of persons: Smart
border 2.0.49 The proposal recognizes that a border
with controls is necessary and this document is
intended to make the border as frictionless and open
as possible. This could be achieved through the use of
technological innovations, cooperation agreements and
various systems of pre-checks. The method is based on
systems used at borders such as Norway-Sweden, New
Zealand-Australia and Canada-United States. Although
Smart Border 2.0 relies on technology to reduce fric-
tion level at the border, it still requires a certain level
of both physical and digital infrastructure. As far as we
are concerned, therefore, this proposal cannot prevent
that there will still be a ‘hard border’ (although the
level of friction will be lower than on other customs
borders).
5 CONCLUSION
At this moment it seems likely that a Brexit transition
period will be agreed (in accordance with the draft with-
drawal agreement) that will last from 29 March 2019 to
31 December 2020. However, if the Brexit negotiation or
ratification process cannot be completed in time (before
29 March 2019), a ‘hard Brexit’ will take place on 29
March 2019, the impact of which would be immense for
EU-UK trade.
42 Ibid.
43 House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2017), Brexit
and the future of Customs – Second Report of Session 2017–2019
Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report, HC
401.
44 Ibid.
45 European Parliament – Policy Department for Citizen’s Rights and
Constitutional Affairs, Study for the AFCO Committee, Smart
Border 2.0 Avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland for
Customs control and the free movement of persons, PE 596.828-
Nov. 2017.
46 Ibid., at 110.
47 Ibid., at 110.
48 European Commission, Task Force for the Preparation and
Conduct of the Negotiations with the United Kingdom under Art.
50 TEU, Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community
highlighting the progress made (coloured version) in the negotia-
tion round with the UK of 16–19 Mar. 2018, TF50 (2018)
35 – Commission to EU27.
49 European Parliament – Policy Department for Citizen’s Rights and
Constitutional Affairs, Study for the AFCO Committee, Smart
Border 2.0 Avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland for
Customs control and the free movement of persons, PE 596.828-
Nov. 2017.
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As far as the long term future trade relationship
between the EU and the UK is concerned, we see four
possibilities (in order of likelihood):
(1) A comprehensive free trade agreement, similar
(although more far-reaching) to the recent EU
free trade agreements with Canada and South
Korea;
(2) No deal between the EU and the UK, as a result of
which there will be a fall back to WTO rules
(whereby we expect that after a certain period of
time a comprehensive free trade agreement will be
concluded);
(3) A Customs Union with the EU;
(4) Elimination of customs duties on import into the
UK.
Regardless of the above scenarios (except for the –
currently – unlikely Customs Union scenario), we see a
number of certainties regarding the future trade relation-
ship between the EU and the UK:
(1) All EU-UK movements of goods will become subject
to customs formalities from 29 March 2019 or from
1 January 2021, both on the EU and the UK side;
(2) The UK will cease to be a party to the current and
future EU free trade agreements as of 29 March
2019. During the possible transitional period until
1 January 2021 these agreements will still be
applied to trade between the UK and third coun-
tries with whom these agreements have been con-
cluded. The big question, however, is whether
these countries will agree and whether they will
require further concessions from the UK;
(3) Companies based in the UK (without a permanent
establishment on EU’s mainland) can in principle
no longer use customs licenses in the EU after
Brexit (and vice versa);
(4) Companies and customs authorities are not yet
ready for Brexit, especially in the field of personnel
and IT (particularly if a ‘hard Brexit’ takes place on
29 March 2019);
(5) In all likelihood, a hard Irish customs border will
arise.
From a customs perspective it is clear that Brexit will
have a large impact on EU-UK trade, regardless of the
outcome. It will be crucial to closely follow the nego-
tiations and ratifications on the UK’s withdrawal from
the EU and the future relationship between the EU
and the UK the coming months. We emphasize that
‘nothing has been agreed until everything has been
agreed’.
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